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Abstract
What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We con-
ducted a controlled field experiment to measure the extent to which
monetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers’ performance. We find
that non-monetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetary
gifts of equivalent value. We also observe that when workers are of-
fered the choice, they prefer receiving money but reciprocate as if they
received a non-monetary gift. This result is consistent with the com-
mon saying, “it’s the thought that counts”. We underline this point by
showing that also monetary gifts can effectively trigger reciprocity if
the employer invests more time and effort into the gift’s presentation.
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“The psychological impact of providing tangible or intangible gifts
to employees is likely to depend not only on the magnitude of the
gifts but also on the gifts being seen as (...) costly to the donor
in terms of time or effort.”
James N. Baron and David M. Kreps (1999, p. 109)
1 Introduction
How can firms motivate their employees to provide effort above the minimal
level? This question is of great importance for both theorists and practi-
tioners. Assuming that workers strictly pursue what is in their material
self-interest, a large theoretical literature explores how explicit and implicit
contracts can be designed so that the workers’ interests are aligned with
the firm’s objectives (see MacLeod (2007), Prendergast (1999) or Gibbons
(1998)). A different strand of literature, based on sociological and psycholog-
ical insights, questions the assumption of pure self-interest, underlining the
importance of reciprocity1 in the presence of incomplete contracts (see Fehr,
Goette and Zehnder (2009)). According to this view firms might achieve
higher profits by treating their workforce kindly (e.g. paying fair wages) be-
cause workers reciprocate positively to “gifts” and return favors by exerting
higher effort (Akerlof (1982)). The empirical evidence on gift-exchange is
1By reciprocity, we refer to the behavioral phenomenon of people responding towards
(un)kind treatment likewise, even in the absence of reputational concerns. Economic
theories formalize reciprocal behavior by incorporating the distribution of outcomes, the
perceived kindness of intentions, or simply emotional states as arguments into the individ-
ual utility function (see Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Rabin
(1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), or Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007)).
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mixed. While the results from laboratory experiments are broadly conclusive
and suggest that fixed wages positively influence effort (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl (1993), Hannan, Kagel and Moser (2002), or Charness (2004)), re-
cent field experiments provide only weak or moderate support for positive
reciprocity (e.g. Gneezy and List (2006), Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2010)
or Cohn, Fehr and Goette (2009)). However, both types of approaches have
focused on monetary gifts and paid little attention to the nature of gifts.2
This paper fills this gap and analyzes how strongly workers reciprocate
non-monetary and monetary gifts with higher productivity. For this pur-
pose, we conducted a controlled field experiment in a naturally occurring
work environment. We recruited workers to catalog the books from a library
for a limited time, excluding any possibility of re-employment. The job was
announced with an hourly wage of e12 - the amount actually paid out in our
benchmark treatment. In our cash treatment, the workers received a mone-
tary gift in the form of a 20 percent wage increase. In the bottle treatment,
we gave workers a thermos bottle of equivalent monetary value.3 The results
show that the nature of gifts crucially determines the prevalence and strength
of reciprocal behavior. The cash gift had no significant impact on workers’
productivity. The bottle, however, resulted on average in a 25 percent higher
work performance outweighing the percentage increase in workers’ compen-
sation. We replicated the results from our bottle treatment with a control
2See Falk (2007) and Maréchal and Thöni (2010) for field experiments on non-monetary
gift-exchange in other contexts.
3The gift came as a surprise for the workers and was not tied to performance. See Jeffrey
(2009) and Eriksson and Villeval (2010) for laboratory studies analyzing performance
contingent non-monetary incentives. See also Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) for a field
experiment studying the effects of symbolic awards.
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treatment where we explicitly mentioned the bottle’s market price. Biased
beliefs about the gift’s market price thus cannot account for the differences
between the cash and the bottle treatments.
We further show that preferences in favor of the non-monetary gift do not
drive our results. Almost all workers preferred the money in an additional
treatment where they could choose between receiving cash or the bottle.
Strikingly, average work productivity was as high as if workers received the
bottle and thus significantly higher than when they only received the money
(without having the choice). The latter results are consistent with the com-
mon saying that it is the thought - i.e. the time and effort invested into the
gift - that counts (see Baron and Kreps (1999), Robben and Verhallen (1994),
or Webley, Lea and Portalska (1983)). Workers did not choose the bottle,
but the employer still incurred the time and effort for choosing, buying, and
wrapping the gift. To provide a more direct test whether time and effort
matter, we conducted a final treatment. In this treatment the employer gave
the workers money in the form of an origami (i.e. the money was artistically
folded and wrapped). The origami was identical to the cash gift, except that
the employer had invested more time and effort into the gift. The results
show that workers reciprocated the origami by producing 30 percent more
output relative to the baseline.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We outline the ex-
perimental design in Section 2 and present the empirical results in Section
3. Finally we discuss how our results relate to the theoretical literature on
gift-exchange and conclude the paper in Section 4.
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2 Experimental Design
The libraries of two economic chairs at a German University had to be cat-
aloged. We used this opportunity to run a field experiment and recruited
workers from all over the campus with posters. The announcement read that
it was a one-time job opportunity for half a day (three hours), and that pay
would amount to e12 per hour. We emphasized the one-shot nature of this
job offer in order to rule out reputational concerns, which are inherent in on-
going relations. The hourly wage of e12 served as a common reference point.
A large number of candidates applied during the announcement phase. A
research assistant randomly picked subjects from the list of applicants. They
were invited with an email and asked to confirm the starting date, reminding
them that the job would pay e12 per hour.
Upon arriving on the working day, workers were separated from each other
and placed in different rooms in front of a computer (with internet browser)
and a table with a random selection of books. Their task was to enter the
books’ author(s), title, publisher, year, and ISBN number into an electronic
data base. The computer application recorded the time of each log, allowing
us to reconstruct the number of characters each person entered over time,
without having to monitor work performance explicitly.4 A research assistant
explained the task, strictly following a protocol.5 The workers were allowed
to take a break whenever necessary. This data entry task is well suited for our
experiment and is frequently used in field experiments because it allows for a
4See Figure 7 in the Appendix for a screen shot of the computer application
5Within each wave of experiments, all workers interacted with the same female research
assistant, preventing potential confounding experimenter effects. The research assistants
neither knew the purpose of the study nor the reason for the treatment variations.
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precise measurement of output and quality.6 Moreover, the task is relatively
simple and can be done in isolation, allowing for more control than usually
available in other field settings.
Before workers actually started performing their task, the different treat-
ments were announced: we reminded the workers of their hourly wage and
informed them about any additional payments or benefits. The latter addi-
tional payments and benefits were the only difference between the treatments.
Altogether, we conducted six treatments.
In our benchmark treatment Baseline, the workers received e12 per
hour in cash at the end of the working day, without any additional benefits.
In treatment Money, total wages were unexpectedly raised by roughly 20
percent by paying an additional fixed amount of e7. In treatment Bot-
tle, instead of the pay raise, workers received a thermos bottle worth e7,
which was wrapped in a transparent gift paper (see left photo in Figure 1).
While the bottle was handed over to the workers immediately with the an-
nouncement, the e7 cash gift was given together with the regular wage at
the end of the employment. In order to account for this potential timing
confound, we ran an additional control treatment MoneyUpfront, where
the e7 cash gift was paid out immediately after the announcement. Pay-
ing e7 at the end together with the hourly wage seems more natural, but
MoneyUpfront more closely resembles treatment Bottle with respect to the
timing of the gift. However, we found no significant performance differences
between Money and MoneyUpfront (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p=0.756, 2-
6See Gneezy and List (2006), Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2010), Kosfeld and Necker-
mann (2011) and Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2010) for some recent exam-
ples.
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sided). We therefore pooled them in the following analysis and refer to them
together as treatment Money.
Figure 1: Gifts In-Kind: Bottle and Origami
Notes: The first photo on the left depicts how the bottle was presented. In treatment
PriceTag the e7 price tag was left visible at the bottom of the bottle. The other two
photos contain the e7 origami in and outside of the envelope.
In order to control for workers’ perceptions about the actual price of
the bottle, we ran treatment PriceTag. PriceTag was analogous to Bottle,
except that we explicitly mentioned the bottle’s market price and marked it
with a corresponding price tag. A comparison of the treatments PriceTag
and Bottle allowed us to assess the robustness of our results with regard to
the uncertainty of the actual price of the gift.
In treatment Choice, workers could choose between receiving e7 in cash
or the bottle. We presented the bottle in exactly the same way as in Price-
Tag, ensuring that every worker knew that the two options were equivalent
in monetary terms. Treatment Choice served two purposes. First, it allowed
us to elicit revealed preferences for receiving cash or the bottle. This will
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illustrate whether a preference in favor of one of the different gifts drives
treatment differences between Money and Bottle. Second, it allows to test the
importance of correctly guessing the recipients’ preferences (see Prendergast
and Stole (2001)). By providing the alternative of e7 in cash, the employer
sends a weaker signal about his knowledge of the recipient’s tastes.
Finally, we used treatment Origami to test whether the time and effort
invested in the provision of gifts matters. Workers received an origami-shirt,
folded out of a five euro bill, and a two euro coin glued together on a plain
postcard. The gift card was also wrapped in a transparent envelope (see
the second and third photo from the left in Figure 1). Treatment Origami
mirrored treatment Money, except that the employer invested more time and
effort in the cash gift.
All types of gifts (e7 in form of cash, bottle, or origami) were announced
in the same way: “We have a further small gift to thank you: You will also
receive [type of gift(s)].” Table 6 in the Appendix provides an overview of
the different treatments with a translation of their announcements.
We conducted two waves of experiments, one in May 2007 and the other
in July and August 2010. The experiments took place over a 12, respectively
15, day period, with up to 6 workers per day. The first wave included treat-
ments Baseline, Money, Bottle, and PriceTag. The second wave included
MoneyUpfront, Choice, Origami, and an additional Baseline treatment. We
conducted a second Baseline treatment in order to control for temporal pro-
ductivity differences between the two waves. We found no significant pro-
ductivity differences between the two benchmark treatments (rank sum test,
p=0.373, two-sided) and therefore pooled the data in the analysis. All para-
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metric regression models contain a dummy variable controlling for the wave.
The treatments were randomized over time slots and weekdays to avoid
treatment effects from being confounded by general productivity shocks oc-
curring at different times of the day or weekdays. The allocation of workers
to the various treatment groups was randomized as well. We further took
great care to avoid any treatment contamination through social interaction
and requested workers to arrive sequentially at different times (three work-
ers each in the morning and in the afternoon) and seated them in separate
rooms. Moreover, we did not tell them that we had employed other work-
ers. The invited workers were randomly selected from the pool of applicants,
which consisted of about 300 applicants in the first and 110 in the second
wave. None of the workers from the second wave had participated in the first
wave. Roughly eleven percent of the invited workers failed to show up at the
scheduled time. We had a total of 35 workers in the Baseline (17 in Baseline
I and 18 in Baseline II), 34 in Money (16 in Money and 18 in MoneyUpfront),
15 in Bottle, 15 in PriceTag, 18 in Origami, and 22 in Choice.
After 3 hours elapsed, all workers completed a short employee question-
naire and received their total wages. In order to observe them in a natural
environment, the workers were not told that they were participating in an
experiment.
3 Results
The number of characters entered measures workers’ productivity precisely
and is considered as our main outcome variable for the subsequent analy-
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sis.7 Figure 2 depicts the development of output over time for treatments
Money and Bottle in comparison with treatment Baseline. Consistent with
previous field experiments involving monetary gifts, a plain wage increase of
roughly 20 percent had only a moderate impact on productivity: Compared
to the benchmark treatment, the average number of characters entered was
approximately 5 percent higher in treatment Money. As indicated in Table 1
below, this difference does not reach statistical significance (Wilcoxon rank
sum test: p= 0.670). Result 1 summarizes this behavioral regularity:
Result 1: The unexpected 20 percent fixed pay-raise in treatment Money
increased workers’ productivity by 5 percent on average. This effect, however,
does not reach statistical significance.
The results from treatment Bottle, on the other hand, paint a different
picture. Workers entered on average roughly 25 percent more characters than
in Baseline. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 2 Panel (b), this treatment
effect remained large over the entire duration of the experiment. The gift im-
plied an increase in workers’ compensation by only 20 percent. The elasticity
of output with respect to compensation amounts to remarkable 1.23. Table 1
shows that the gift-exchange effect is also significant from a statistical point
of view. Using Wilcoxon rank sum tests, the hypotheses of identical produc-
tivity between treatments Bottle and Baseline (as well as between Bottle and
Money) are rejected (p < 0:01, respectively p < 0:05). The main findings are
summarized in our second result:
7We focus on output quantity first and postpone the analysis of the quality dimension
of work performance to the end of this section.
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Figure 2: Money versus Bottle
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Notes: This figure depicts the average number of characters entered per 30 minutes’ time
interval for treatment Money (a), Bottle (b) as well as work performance in the benchmark
treatment Baseline.
Result 2: In contrast to the pay raise, a gift in-kind of equivalent monetary
value resulted in a statistically significant 25 percent productivity gain. This
effect was larger than the relative increase in labor compensation.
Understanding the Currency of Reciprocity
Given that there was no price tag on the bottle, most workers probably
were unaware of its exact market value. Workers might have systematically
overestimated the market value, which could potentially explain the larger
treatment effect in Bottle relative to Money. Treatment PriceTag allows us
to test whether the uncertainty with respect to the gift’s market price drives
10
the effect. Given that we communicated the gift’s price, output should have
been lower in treatment PriceTag than in Bottle if workers reciprocated only
on the basis of monetary considerations and if they overestimated the gift’s
price. The performance pattern in Figure 3 reveals, however, that treatment
PriceTag closely replicated the results from treatment Bottle. Workers were
slightly less productive in PriceTag than in Bottle - measured output was 2.7
percent lower. However, this difference does not reach statistical significance
(Wilcoxon rank sum test: p=0.663).
Figure 3: PriceTag
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Notes: This figure depicts the average number of characters entered per 30 minutes’ time
interval for treatment PriceTag and the Baseline.
Similar to Bottle, treatment PriceTag resulted in a 21 percent higher
output compared to the benchmark treatment (p=0.005). These productivity
gains were still slightly larger than the relative increase in compensation of
11
the workers. We summarize the results as follows:
Result 3: We replicated Result 2 with treatment PriceTag. Workers pro-
duced almost an equal output in treatments PriceTag and Bottle. In compar-
ison with Baseline, treatment PriceTag resulted in a 21 percent increase in
productivity. The uncertainty concerning the exact market price of the gift
in-kind thus failed to account for the treatment effects.
A second important question is whether the workers preferred receiving
the bottle rather than its cash equivalent. In treatment Choice, we offered
workers the choice between receiving an additional e7 in cash or in form
of the bottle. The bottle was presented in the same way as in treatment
PriceTag - i.e. all workers knew that the bottle was worth e7. Panel (a) of
Figure 4 shows that the vast majority of workers - 18 out of the 22 workers
- opted for e7 in cash.
We are able to reject the hypothesis that workers were drawn from a
population in which preferences for cash and the bottle are equiprobable
(binomial test, two sided p=0.004).8 We thus conclude:
Result 4: When workers were given the choice between receiving a cash gift
of e7 or a bottle of equivalent value, more than 80 percent chose the cash gift.
The gift in-kind thus is unlikely to correspond to its recipient’s preferences.
Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows how work performance developed over time
8An earlier version of this paper included additional results from an experiment where
subjects in an unrelated lab experiment could actually choose between receiving e7 or the
bottle in addition to their other earnings. The results were very similar: 159 out of 172
subjects (92.4 percent) opted for e7 in cash rather than the thermos of equivalent value
(binomial test, two sided p < 0:0001).
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Figure 4: Choice
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Notes: The graph in Panel (a) compares the frequency of choice of the bottle (worth e7)
and the e7 in cash. Panel (b) depicts the average number of characters entered per 30
minutes’ time interval for treatment Choice and work performance in the Baseline.
in treatments Choice and Baseline.9 Output was about 25 percent larger
in treatment Choice than in Baseline (Wilcoxon rank sum test: p=0.006,
see Table 1). This treatment effect is of almost identical magnitude as in
treatment Bottle. Moreover, performance was around 18 percent higher than
in treatment Money (p=0.038, see Table 1). This result seems surprising,
given that almost all workers chose the same gift as in treatment Money. We
summarize our results:
9We pooled the four workers who took the bottle with the other 18 workers. The
treatment effect thus measures the effect of receiving the choice between an additional
e7 and the bottle. If we were to condition on the workers’ actual choice, we would face
potential selection effects. However, the results are robust if we exclude the four workers
who chose the bottle from the analysis.
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Result 5: Despite the fact that almost all workers opted for e7 in cash,
workers’ output was substantially higher in treatment Choice than in Baseline
and Money.
Simply offering the bottle was enough to trigger reciprocal reactions -
even if the workers did not choose the bottle. Together, Results 5 and 1
are consistent with the common saying “it’s the thought that counts”. One
possible explanation for these results is that the time and effort the donor
invests into a gifts - and not the gift per se - matters. If this explanation
indeed drives the results, we should be able to trigger reciprocal responses
with money too, provided we invest more time and effort into the cash gift.
This is what we did in treatment Origami.
Table 1: Average Treatment Effects: # Characters Entered
Baseline Money Bottle PriceTag Choice
Money +5.2%
Bottle +24.8% *** +18.7% **
PriceTag +21.4% *** +15.5% ** -2.7%
Choice +24.5% *** +18.4% ** -0.2% +2.5%
Origami +29.3% *** +23.0% ** +3.6% +6.5% +3.8%
Notes: This table reports average treatment effects (in percentage) for all treatment com-
parisons (i.e. treatments indicated in the first column are compared with those in the first
row). The outcome variable is the number of characters entered as a performance mea-
sure. Significance levels from a non-parametric (two-sided) Wilcoxon rank sum test for
the null hypothesis of equal output between treatments are denoted as follows: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
As depicted in Figure 5, treatment Origami had a similar treatment effect
as the bottle. Output was almost 30 percent higher in Origami than in
Baseline, which is significant from a statistical point of view (p=0.001 see
14
Figure 5: Origami
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Notes: This figure depicts the average number of characters entered per 30 minutes’ time
interval for treatment Origami as well as work performance in the Baseline.
Table 1). This treatment effect was even slightly larger than the effect of the
bottle, but the difference does not reach statistical significance (p=0.539).
In contrast, productivity was 23 percent higher than in treatment Money
(p=0.012). We summarize these observations in the following result:
Result 6: The origami - i.e. an artistically folded and wrapped cash gift -
resulted in a statistically and economically significant productivity gain.
Robustness Checks
The cumulative distribution functions in Figure 6 in the appendix show
that one or two single workers did not drive our results; instead the treat-
ment effects reflect broad behavioral phenomena. In comparison with treat-
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ment Baseline, the performance distributions in treatments Bottle, PriceTag,
Choice, and Origami were clearly shifted towards higher output levels. How-
ever, the cumulative distribution function from treatment Money was closely
intertwined with that from Baseline. For example, the share of workers en-
tering 10’000 characters or less was around 40 percent in treatment Origami.
In contrast this fraction amounted to 80 percent in treatment Baseline. Pair-
wise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that the distributions from all gift-
treatments were significantly different from the Baseline (p < 0:05), except
for treatment Money (p=0.741). Moreover, the distribution functions for
Bottle, PriceTag, Choice, and Origami were all significantly different from
Money (p < 0:05).
The previous analysis focused on non-parametric unconditional treat-
ment comparisons. We complemented these results with a regression analysis
which allowed us to control for various potential performance influences.10
For this purpose, we constructed a panel data set by slicing the data into six
30 minute intervals. The benchmark model had the following specification:
Yit = + 1Gi + 2Tit + X i + i + i + i + !i + it; (1)
where Yit represents the number of characters entered by worker i in time
interval t. Gi is a vector consisting of dummy variables indicating each of the
different gift treatments. Treatment Baseline was omitted from the model
and served as the reference category. T it takes values from zero to five, in-
dicating the six time intervals. Xi is a vector containing controls for the
10See Table 3 for summary statistics of our control variables.
16
workers’ age and gender. The wave fixed effect (i) controls for general per-
formance differences between the two waves of experiments. Furthermore, we
included weekday (i) and room (!i) fixed effects as well as a dummy variable
for sessions conducted in the afternoon (i). We estimated our model using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard errors were corrected for clustering,
accounting for individual dependency of the error term it over time.
The results from the benchmark model are displayed in column (1) of Ta-
ble 2. Consistent with the non-parametric analysis, the coefficient for Money
is small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, all other gift treatments
have large positive and significant coefficient estimates. Furthermore the
Wald tests reported at the bottom of Table 2 suggest that the coefficients for
Bottle, PriceTag, Choice, and Origami are significantly different from Money.
The results also suggest the presence of a significant learning effect as indi-
cated by the positive time trend. We explored how the treatment effects
evolved over time by interacting all treatment dummies with the time trend
in the extended model in column (2) of Table 2. The results remain robust
and none of the interaction effects is significant, suggesting that treatment
effects remained stable over time (see also Figures 2 to 5).
In contrast to the quantity of output, quality is more difficult to ob-
serve for the employer. An important question is therefore whether the ob-
served productivity gains primarily stemmed from workers producing more
low quality output. In order to test for quality differences, we measured
output quality by the ratio of correctly entered books to the total number
of books entered.11 With a quality ratio of 81.4 percent, quality was low-
11See Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2010) and Kube, Maréchal and Puppe
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est in the benchmark treatment. Apart from the higher quantity of output,
workers also provided better quality output in all gift treatments, including
treatment Money. In comparison with the Baseline, the increase in quality
was highest in treatment Origami (90.6 percent quality ratio) and lowest in
treatment Bottle (83.4 percent quality ratio). Except for treatment Bottle,
all quality differences with respect to the Baseline are statistically significant
(p < 0:05, see Table 7 in the appendix).
Furthermore, we used the number of characters from correct entries as
the dependent measure in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. This is a compos-
ite measure of work performance, taking both the quantity and the quality
dimension of effort into account. All results remain qualitatively unchanged
if we use this alternative performance measure. Interestingly, the Time and
Origami interaction term is positive and significant on a 10 percent level,
suggesting that the effect of the Origami even tended to increase over time.
Finally, evidence from social psychology suggests that positive affect can
influence motivation and helping behavior (e.g. Isen and Reeve (2005) or Isen
and Levin (1972) ). Mood effects generally tend to be rather short lived (see
Isen, Clark and Schwartz (1976)). Nevertheless, we tested to what extend
differences in positive affect drive our treatment effects. For this purpose we
included a non-verbal pictorial assessment of positive affect (Self Assessment
Manikin - see Bradley and Lang (1994)) in the employee questionnaire at the
end of the experiments of the second wave. We find no significant differences
in positive affect between the Baseline, Money Upfront, Origami and Choice
(2010) for a similar approach. Two research assistants searched for spelling mistakes in
the titles (using an automatic spell check program) and ISBN numbers of the books.
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(Kruskal-Wallis test: p=0.490), suggesting that our results are not driven by
differences in affect.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The results from our field experiment highlight a sharp contrast between
non-monetary and purely monetary gifts. In this section we discuss how our
results relate to existing theories of gift-exchange and non-monetary gift giv-
ing and conclude the paper with potential avenues for future research. The
literature has generally explained gift-exchange with outcome and intention-
based theories of social preferences (see Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) for a
survey). These models, however, do not explicitly distinguish between mone-
tary and non-monetary gifts. An outcome-based model of inequality aversion
could explain our results if we assume that workers take the effort and time
the employer has invested in the gift into account. These costs would in-
crease outcome inequalities between workers and the employer by reducing
the employer’s rent.12 A rigorous formulation of this idea, would necessitate
the transformation of all goods exchanged in monetary equivalents. Not only
must the recipient be able to quantify the effort and time of providing the
gifts, he must also form beliefs about the surplus he creates by exerting ef-
fort. Moreover, the effort in our case was directed towards the recipient with
positive intentions. It seems plausible that meaningless effort would result
in no or weaker reciprocal reactions. However, models of inequality aversion
12This argument implicitly assumes that workers are narrow bracketing, i.e. they ignore
the firm’s additional sources of income and focus on the rents from bilateral exchange (see
Card, DellaVigna and Malmendier (forthcoming)).
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do not distinguish between the meaningfulness of effort.13
The widespread phenomenon of non-monetary gift giving has frequently
puzzled economist because gifts in-kind seem less efficient than money. Wald-
fogel’s (1993) study for example, suggests that holiday gift-giving “destroys
between 10 percent and a third of the value of gifts (p. 1328)”. Several the-
ories explicitly addressed non-monetary gift giving. A first class of models
proposes that gifts in-kind can be of higher subjective value to the recipient
than an equivalent cash gift. Search costs as assumed in Kaplan and Ruffle’s
(2009) model, for example, could imply that the bottle is a product that
the workers always wanted to have but have not yet had the opportunity
to buy.14 The results from treatment choice are inconsistent with such an
explanation. Almost all workers preferred the money rather than the bottle.
Prendergast and Stole (2001) developed a model showing that gifts in-
kind allow donors to signal how well they know the recipient’s taste or how
intimate their relationship is. “An individual who can show that he under-
stands the preferences of his partner is likely to be a more desirable partner
than one who has no idea what his partner wants or believes in (Prendergast
and Stole 2001, p. 1795).” Two aspects of our results suggest that signal-
ing intimacy does not explain the observed differences between monetary and
non-monetary gifts. First, our choice experiment suggests that the bottle did
not correspond to the workers’ tastes. Second, by offering the choice between
money and a bottle, the employer plausibly signals less knowledge about the
13For example inequality aversion would also predict that the employer could induce
higher effort by burning his money in front of the employee; or by spending time and
effort to buy and wrap an obviously unfriendly gift.
14See Thaler (1999) for an alternative argument based on self-control issues.
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recipients’ tastes. Nevertheless we observe that workers reciprocated to an
equal extent as in treatment Bottle, where they had no choice.
Several scholars have argued that people can use gifts to signal their will-
ingness to cooperate in future relationships (see Camerer (1988), Carmichael
and MacLeod (1997), Bolle (2001) and Sozou and Seymour (2005)). Accord-
ing to these models, gifts should be costly to the donor and have little value
for the recipient. The lower use value ensures that people will not enter into
exchange relationships simply to collect valuable gifts. We find that gifts are
reciprocated independently of whether the gift is of lower (as in treatment
Bottle) or higher use value (as in Choice or Origami where the workers re-
ceive money) for the recipient. Furthermore, these models seem to be less
relevant for our context, where gifts were offered only after the relationship
was established and there was no possibility for future employment.
Lea, M. and Webley (1987) suggested that one reason for the unaccept-
ability of money as a gift is that it puts an exact monetary value on a relation-
ship. Money could thus potentially reframe a social exchange relationship
into a market or commercial relationship. The lab experiments conducted by
Heyman and Ariely (2004) provide evidence that is supportive of this argu-
ment. In contrast, our results from treatment PriceTag, Choice and Origami
do not corroborate this explanation. The observed treatment effect is equal
to that in treatment Bottle, despite salient information about the gift’s price.
Finally, a recent model from Ellingsen and Johannesson (forthcoming)
proposes that non-monetary gifts can signal the donors’ degree of altruism.
The underlying assumption is that in contrast to self-interested donors, al-
truists find it less burdensome to spend time and effort for other persons.
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Altruistic donors therefore have a comparative advantage in providing non-
monetary gifts. Assuming that workers are willing to provide more effort for
an altruistic employer (e.g. see Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)) our results
might be explained by such a model. However, an explicit test of Ellingsen
and Johannesson (forthcoming) would require heterogeneity among employ-
ers or direct evidence concerning the workers’ beliefs about the employer’s
type.15
Summing up, our results underline the importance of non-monetary as-
pects in employment relations (see also Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002) or
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005)) and suggest that reciprocity has its own
currency which probably cannot be measured in terms of monetary value
alone. Gift-exchange is a more complex phenomenon than previously as-
sumed in the literature. While our study provides suggestive evidence that
the investment of time and effort is crucial for successful gift-exchange, more
theoretical and empirical research is needed to fully understand the exact
mechanism of reciprocity. Several aspects and questions are worth further
investigations. Employees might reciprocate gifts in other dimensions than
productivity, such as absenteeism, retention, or loyalty in general. Do work-
ers still work more if gifts came from someone who did not directly benefit
from the extra effort? Moreover, employment is often characterized by long-
term relations, which could result in different dynamic effects than those we
find in a one-shot relationship. In a dynamic context, workers might become
used to receiving gifts on a regular basis and respond less (see also Gneezy
15An earlier version of this paper included survey evidence suggesting that the bottle is
more likely to be considered as a kind action than a pure cash gift. More detailed results
are available from the authors upon request.
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and List (2006)). Habituation, however, might be inhibited if the timing of
giving gifts appears more random and therefore unpredictable. These issues
promise to be interesting topics for future research.
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Table 2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
———– Entries ———– —— Correct Entries ——
Money 40.350 9.284 123.419 74.576
(85.335) (84.984) (83.760) (80.880)
Bottle 369.563*** 407.991*** 363.303*** 416.061***
(108.830) (107.783) (117.977) (117.061)
PriceTag 345.454*** 354.163*** 411.180*** 421.438***
(111.003) (118.220) (108.651) (109.536)
Choice 263.261** 279.188** 335.597*** 306.344***
(121.061) (112.802) (112.297) (107.023)
Origami 316.467*** 250.958** 436.924*** 347.748***
(117.926) (111.468) (111.883) (108.959)
Time 77.654*** 74.264*** 63.877*** 55.347***
(4.824) (8.274) (4.847) (8.331)
2nd Wave 73.341 73.341 -15.400 -15.400
(127.354) (127.746) (117.552) (117.914)
Time*Money 12.426 19.537
(12.477) (12.666)
Time*Bottle -15.371 -21.103
(12.026) (13.537)
Time*PriceTag -3.484 -4.103
(18.826) (14.812)
Time*Choice -6.371 11.701
(16.668) (14.981)
Time*Origami 26.204 35.671*
(16.267) (19.053)
Constant 1812.104*** 1820.578*** 1481.451*** 1502.776***
(300.568) (300.916) (298.939) (301.266)
Wald tests:
Bottle=Money 0.003 0.038
Pricetag=Money 0.014 0.010
Choice=Money 0.076 0.083
Origami=Money 0.031 0.012
Age and Gender? YES YES YES YES
Weekday FE? YES YES YES YES
Afternoon FE? YES YES YES YES
Room FE? YES YES YES YES
Observations 834
# Workers 139
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors adjusted for clustering
are reported in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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A Appendix
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 23.187 2.802
Male 0.446 0.499
Room 1 0.295 0.458
Room 2 0.180 0.385
Room 3 0.165 0.373
Room 4 0.158 0.366
Room 5 0.201 0.403
Afternoon 0.511 0.502
Monday 0.201 0.403
Tuesday 0.194 0.397
Wednesday 0.230 0.422
Thursday 0.187 0.391
Friday 0.187 0.391
Obs. 139
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Table 4: Data Overview: Number of Characters (Books) Entered and Quality
Treat. ID Total Time Quality Treat. ID Total Time Quality
# Chars. Books ratio # Chars. Books ratio
Base- 1 4570 44 0.500 Money 36 4470 50 0.840
line I 2 5122 55 0.564 37 6010 71 0.915
3 5327 42 0.881 38 6426 60 0.850
4 6862 75 0.547 39 7763 77 0.935
5 7177 76 0.934 40 7801 77 0.857
6 7208 78 0.885 41 7804 80 0.913
7 7217 75 0.880 42 7823 82 0.671
8 7581 66 0.894 43 7883 87 0.908
9 8157 57 0.842 44 7959 84 0.845
10 8607 93 0.753 45 8084 76 0.882
11 8646 105 0.857 46 8180 91 0.813
12 8688 97 0.907 47 9464 100 0.950
13 8919 95 0.800 48 9707 96 0.927
14 9443 99 0.960 49 10774 94 0.723
15 9651 106 0.887 50 11150 112 0.866
16 10224 112 0.946 51 14098 148 0.811
17 12320 136 0.699
Avg. 7983.5 83.0 0.808 Avg. 8462.3 86.6 0.857
Base 18 4552 63 0.825 Money 52 4611 51 0.765
line II 19 6575 69 0.652 Upfront 53 4941 41 0.854
20 6741 68 0.926 54 5840 66 0.833
21 7114 63 0.794 55 6686 53 0.906
22 7247 67 0.791 56 6816 76 0.934
23 7348 88 0.841 57 7266 74 0.811
24 7847 69 0.899 58 7690 85 0.835
25 7936 69 0.899 59 7761 86 0.849
26 8277 74 0.770 60 8254 76 0.961
27 8658 95 0.853 61 8397 73 0.959
28 9396 84 0.952 62 10126 88 0.932
29 9422 81 0.815 63 10218 117 0.940
30 9464 86 0.802 64 10289 91 0.989
31 10365 108 0.611 65 10928 115 0.913
32 10392 90 0.889 66 11082 102 0.922
33 10865 120 0.825 67 12345 112 0.938
34 10964 109 0.817 68 12965 111 0.559
35 12034 101 0.812 69 15603 134 0.933
Avg. 8622.1 83.6 0.821 Avg. 8989.9 86.2 0.880
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Table 5: Data Overview (ctd.)
Treat. ID Total Time Quality Treat. ID Total Time Quality
# Chars. Books ratio # Chars. Books ratio
Bottle 70 6979 61 0.721 PriceTag 107 7503 77 0.909
71 8671 82 0.683 108 7836 82 0.939
72 8756 74 0.919 109 8332 86 0.884
73 9018 92 0.783 110 8701 93 0.957
74 9027 90 0.744 111 8804 103 0.854
75 9492 93 0.903 112 9066 79 0.873
76 9581 98 0.857 113 9449 99 0.889
77 9796 106 0.868 114 9729 91 0.703
78 10922 108 0.778 115 10164 104 0.663
79 10939 112 0.866 116 10846 92 0.957
80 11123 119 0.731 117 11517 116 0.836
81 11936 126 0.865 118 11972 109 0.844
82 12102 103 0.951 119 12059 137 0.949
83 13254 120 0.933 120 12436 115 0.896
84 14011 102 0.902 121 12994 136 0.904
Avg. 10373.8 99.1 0.834 Avg. 10093.9 101.3 0.871
Choice 85 5546 49 0.857 Origami 122 4466 56 0.964
86 6481 58 0.862 123 7219 74 0.946
87 7525 78 0.962 124 7385 81 0.778
88 7747 81 0.802 125 8854 98 0.918
89 8063 72 0.806 126 9131 74 0.892
90 8293 96 0.958 127 9439 94 0.862
91 8305 91 0.835 128 9550 85 0.871
92 9186 84 0.833 129 10623 96 0.917
93 9426 76 0.934 130 11062 96 0.906
94 9640 104 0.837 131 11119 99 0.889
95 9677 93 0.925 132 11568 103 0.961
96 10215 93 0.699 133 11610 118 0.890
97 10682 87 0.862 134 11928 101 0.891
98 10735 108 0.870 135 12389 114 0.904
99 10970 102 0.912 136 13158 149 0.953
100 11279 124 0.935 137 13725 153 0.895
101 11317 120 0.917 138 14717 130 0.962
102 12620 139 0.964 139 15520 147 0.905
103 13869 115 0.870
104 14197 129 0.907
105 15482 137 0.825
106 16459 143 0.944
Avg. 10350.6 99.0 0.878 Avg. 10747.9 103.8 0.906
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Table 7: Average Treatment Effects: Quality Ratio
Baseline Money Bottle PriceTag Choice
Money +6.7% **
Bottle +2.4% -4.0%
PriceTag +6.9% ** +0.2% +4.4%
Choice +7.8% ** +1.1% +5.3% +0.9%
Origami +11.2% *** +4.3% +8.6% ** +4.0% +3.2%
Notes: This table reports average treatment effects (in percentage) for all treatment com-
parisons (i.e. treatments indicated in the first column are compared with those in the first
row). The outcome variable is the quality ratio. Significance levels from a non-parametric
(two-sided) Wilcoxon rank sum test for the null hypothesis of equal quality between treat-
ments are denoted as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution Functions
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
4000 8000 12000 16000
# of characters entered
Money
Baseline
(a) Money
4000 8000 12000 16000
# of characters entered
Bottle
Baseline
(b) Bottle
4000 8000 12000 16000
# of characters entered
PriceTag
Baseline
(c) PriceTag
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
4000 8000 12000 16000
# of characters entered
Choice
Baseline
(d) Choice
4000 8000 12000 16000
# of characters entered
Origami
Baseline
(e) Origami
Notes: This figure depicts the cumulative distribution functions of the total number of
characters entered for treatments (a) Money, (b) Bottle, (c) PriceTag, (d) Choice, and (e)
Origami in comparison with the Baseline treatment.
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Figure 7: Screenshot: Computer Application
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